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Cовместный семинар Аспирантской школы по философским наукам и Международной лаборатории логики, лингвистики и формальной философии

Мероприятие завершено
3 апреля в 18.10 в ауд. 415 состоится совместный семинар Аспирантской школы по философским наукам и Международной лаборатории логики, лингвистики и формальной философии.
С докладами выступят сотрудники МЛ ЛогЛинФФ Михаил Алексеевич Смирнов и Хорхе Луис Мендес Мартинес.
М. А. Смирнов. Онтологические основания семантики событий

Семантика событий в широком смысле — совокупность подходов к построению формальных языков или интерпретации естественных языков, в которых событие фигурирует в качестве онтологического коррелята некоторого типа языковых единиц. В узком смысле под семантикой событий принято подразумевать (нео)дэвидсоновский подход к трактовке логической формы естественно-языковых контекстов. В основе этого подхода лежит идея о том, что глагол следует трактовать как предикат, одним из аргументов которого (или единственным аргументом) является переменная, пробегающая над предметной областью событий. Этот подход доминирует в современной лингвистике, поскольку, как считается, он дает решение для ряда технических проблем и объяснение для ряда естественно-языковых феноменов. Однако логико-философская сторона этого решения является проблематичной и требует дополнительного анализа, который и будет предложен в докладе.

Хорхе Луис Мендес-Мартинес. 

(1) If sounds were dispositions, a framework for an underdeveloped theory

In this talk I will address two different writings if time allows it. First, I’ll present one of the papers I wrote during my Academic Stay in the Frei Universität Berlin in the Winter Semester, concerning the dispositional account on sounds; and, secondly, the first chapter of my dissertation, which is related to the problems of theory choice within the ontology of sounds and some metametaphysical considerations. I explore the so-called dispositional stance in sound ontology (SO) (Pasnau 1999, Kulvicki 2008, Roberts 2017) which holds that sounds are distal properties of the objects and, not only that, but dispositional properties. I argue that this view on sounds has some attractive aspects but that, ultimately, it fails to give a compelling picture on sounds and, henceforth, maybe it is not the best way to understand sounds. In order to demonstrate this, I first address the overall discussion on the nature of sounds, namely, SO, and the positions within it. After recognising that there is a problem of conceptual underspecification, I pay attention, in the next section, to the debate on dispositions, a thing that usually is cast aside by the proponents of the dispositional view. In a third section, I address the current state of affairs of the dispositional view on sounds and I try to match it with the discussion on dispositions. In this sense, in this section the aim is not only critical, but constructive as well as I try to advance this view. In the last section, I pay attention to the objections, already made to this framework and I set forth new ones which, to my believe, the dispositional view cannot sort out at least under its current form.  


(2) Logic and Phenomenology of Non-Visual Representation. The case of Sound. Chapter 1, Guidelines, Questions and Theory Choice 

 In this chapter I am aimed at the metaphilosophical and metametaphysical implications within the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience, in general, and the ontology of sound, in particular. The first step towards this is distinguishing the context of discussion, namely, philosophy, as different from that of science. In doing so, it is important to emphasise a key caveat: philosophy of sounds is not going to produce the same sort of knowledge, science does. This will be addressed in section §2. Secondly, while examining the alternatives displayed by sound ontology, it seems as if we had a matter of choice here and, more concretely, theory choice. Yet, things do not lay out in the fashion of a theory choice sort of discussion, which I deem crucial for having the overall picture of the philosophy of sound and to assess its conceptual profundity. Usually, in SO a theory is chosen over another not because its way of complying with a pre-determined set of criteria, but because its ability to face some puzzles or to account for some important aspects of sound and auditory experience itself. These are, indeed, the two broad categories on which I observe the discussion unfolding: objects of dispute, which covers perception and experience, the spatial features of sound, and the relationship between sounds and sources; and, on the other hand, the puzzles, that is challenging arguments (not always very intuitive) that either theory can deal with relative success, for instance the argument from the vacuum, the problem of individuation (Nudds 2008, Méndez-Martínez 2019), the problem of the infinite waves (Meadows 2018), and so on. This set of issues is all we have in order to choose sides in SO and not even that is properly systematised, so that is the task of section §4. Finally, after a critical assessment of what the big picture on sounds entails, in section §5 I will set forth a last consideration on the importance of philosophising about sounds.